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BAIL AS A MATTER OF RIGHTIN RE UNDERWOOD
For the last few years the debate over pretrial detention versus
bail as a matter of right has continued unabated. The rising
crime rate has intensified the resolve of those who feel -that we -must detain "dangerous" persons for the protection of society. On the other
hand, the critics of preventive detention argue that the "dangerousness" of released persons is not predictable with certainty and that by
allowing a procedure such as preventive detention, we ultimately encroach upon the constitutional rights of everyone, including the "threatened" majority.
Most of the debate regarding preventive detention has centered
around federal legislation and federal constitutional construction. Such
interpretations are relevant to any discussion of bail as a matter of
right as they may well have an ultimate effect upon state -action, especially if the United States Supreme Court determines ithat Eighth
Amendment guarantees require the states as well as the federal government to grant bail as a matter of right in all noncapital cases. Presently, however, this controversy over preventive detention is not directly
relevant in the great majority of the states. That is, the state constitutional provisions are often more restrictive on the power of their governments to restrict bail than is their federal counterpart.
While this note will discuss some of the arguments both for and
against preventive detention, its primary focus will be to analyze state
constitutional guarantees to bail as a matter of right with emphasis on
California law. The California Supreme Court settled the controversy
within its jurisdiction in the case of In re Underwood' by holding that
the state constitution requires the granting of bail as a matter of right
in all noncapital cases and that there is no "public safety" exception.
The body of this note will illustrate that state guarantees are
more specific than federal guarantees and thus there is less room for
arguable debate as to their meaning. However, there are still some
questions which must be resolved concerning ,the right to bail: Is it an
absolute right, or are there exceptions such as revocation of the right
for abuse or violation of the conditions of bail? How is the right affected by the elimination of the death penalty? What is to be done with
persons who are known to be "dangerous"?
1. 9 Cal. 3d 345, 508 P.2d 721, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1973).
[559]
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The In Re Underwood Case
The scenario of the Underwood case was typical of those involving "dangerous" suspects. On June 20, 1972, the defendant was arrested and charged with possession of a sawed-off shotgun. Bond was
set at $500, and, upon the defendant's posting of bail, he was released.
A few days later the suspect was rearrested and charged with the following offenses: possession of a sawed-off shotgun, attempt to explode a destructive device with intent to commit murder and attempted
murder, attempt to explode a destructive device with intent to injure
people or property, and possession of a destructive device. The state
alleged that the defendant had attempted to mail a package containing a live "pipe bomb" to the police station where the arresting officers
for the first offense were stationed.
At the time of the defendant's arraignment, the prosecutor indicated to the court that the defendant was already at liberty on bail in a
pending case involving a similar charge, and because of that "pending
case" and the gravity of the offense in the instant case, the district attorney recommended that no bail be set. Thereafter the magistrate denied bail on the grounds that the defendant was a danger to himself
and to others and ordered him held to answer in the superior court.
The superior court judge also denied bail stating:
Due to the fact that there is a dearth of legal opinion in the matter it is usually up to the judge to make a decision. If the judge
doesn't make a decision we never have any new law. If I am reversed I have been reversed before and I believe will be again.
But I am not afraid to make a decision if I believe in that one.
I believe as Justice Douglas stated where the safety of the community would be jeopardized it would be irresponsible judicial action
to grant bail 2. . . . The time has come where we must restrain violence and death as much as possible. If it is necessary to resolve
it by denying bail to those who can or are able to perpetrate murders and violence and crimes of that nature, then the court at this
time will not be reluctant to deny bail, and3 bail is denied. Let
the District Court of Appeal make their ruling.
The judge of the superior court had reason to be unsure of the
soundness of his ruling because there was great confusion in the law as
to the nature of the right to bail. This confusion was grounded in a
conflict between the constitutional guarantee and the developing case
law. The California Constitution was seemingly clear:
All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital
offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great. Excessive bail shall not be required . . .. 4
2. The trial court here was relying on Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662
(Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962).
3. Record at 11, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 508 P2.d 721, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1973);

id. at 347, 508 P.2d at 722, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
4. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
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The case law, however, indicated that if there was a danger posed to
the public safety, the defendant could be preventively detained-that
is, denied bail.5
The ultimate issue faced by the superior court judge was how the
defendant could be detained when none of his alleged offenses was a
capital crime, and article I, section 6 of the California Constitution
therefore entitled him to be released on bail as a matter of right. The
statutes enacted thereunder were in agreement. 6 But the defendant
appeared to pose a public safety hazard and the case law indicated
he could be held without bail.7 The defendant argued that there was
no statutory or constitutional provision of the state of California which
permitted the denial of pretrial bail in noncapital cases; nor was pretrial bail a matter of judicial discretion. Hence he had to be granted
bail as a matter of right before his trial."
Of course the obvious effect of the denial of bail was to leave the
defendant incarcerated before trial for what he contended were bailable
charges. It was therefore argued that the defendant was deprived
of his fundamental constitutional rights to bail and that those denials,
imprisonment and restraint, were in violation of due process of law
guaranteed to all citizens under article I, section 6 of the California
Constitution, and under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
federal Constitution. 9 It was further contended that denial of or delay
in setting bail was unconscionable in that it would permit the defendant to languish in custody, thereby impairing his ability to assist in the
preparation of his defense for trial, as well as occasioning an additional violation of due process each day that his right to bail was denied.
The California Supreme Court reversed the lower court ruling and
held that bail in noncapital cases was a mater of right and that there
was no public safety exception. The supreme court relied solely on
the language of article I, section 6 of the California Constitution and
enabling legislation enacted thereunder. It distinguished the federal
constitutional guarantees under the Eighth Amendment by saying:
Our constitutional language expressly providing that all persons
shall be bailable except for a capital offense was convciously added
to the 'no excessive bail' language adopted from -the Eighth Amend5. See, e.g., Bean v. County of Los Angeles, 252 Cal. App. 2d 754, 757, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 804, 807 (1967).
6. See CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1270, 1271 (West 1970).
7. See, e.g., Bean v. County of Los Angeles, 252 Cal. App. 2d 754, 60 Cal. Rptr.
804 (1967); Evans v. Municipal Court, 207 Cal. App. 2d 633, 24 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1962);
In re Gentry, 206 Cal. App. 2d 723, 24 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1962); In re Henley, 18 Cal.
App. 1, 121 P. 933 (1912).
8. Brief for Petitioner at 2, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 508 P.2d 721, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1973).

9, Id. at 13,

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

ment in order to make clear that, unlike the federal rule, all except the one class of defendants were to be bailable. 10
Thus, the detention of persons dangerous to themselves or to
others is not within the contemplation of the California criminal bail
system, and if it becomes necessary to detain such persons, authorization for it must be found elsewhere--either in existing law" or future
provisions of the law.12 As the court said in In re Keddy, "If the constitutional guaranties are wrong, let the people change them-not
judges or legislators."' 3
In considering alternative provisions, the supreme court recognized that there was a civil commitment procedure for individuals who
fall into certain categories;' 4 but as the dissent noted, these provisions
of the Welfare and Institutions Code would not apply to the "coldblooded, professional criminal, and yet it is precisely such an individual who poses the greatest threat of harm.""
Thus, the problem is
framed: What do we do with the known dangerous person who attempts to kill three people in a supermarket and fails? If we release
him on bail and he attempts to kill three more people the next day and
is rearrested, do we have to release him again? Theoretically, the
crime spree could go on ad infinitum until the accused could finally
be brought to trial or until he committed a capital offense. The problem, of course, is that the likelihood of such recidivism is extremely unpredictable at this juncture.' 6 Yet the question remains: Is there a
limit to the right to bail, or is it an absolute right? Whose rights take
precedence, those of Mr. Underwood or those of society? What type of
balancing takes place when alternative constitutional rights are
weighed? And, finally, are there any satisfactory alternatives to the
present system?
Historical Origin
Article I, section 6 of the California Constitution is typical of
many states' constitutions. As the supreme court correctly observed in
Underwood, this provision contains not only the federal constitutional
guarantee against excessive bail but includes some additional protection as well. By the time of California's Constitutional Convention in
10. 9 Cal. 3d at 349-50, 508 P.2d at 724, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 404 (emphasis in
original).
11. 9 Cal. 3d at 350 & n.8, 508 P.2d at 724 & n.8, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 404 & n.8.
See generally CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5000-5344 (West 1972).
12. See text accompanying note 119 infra.
13. 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 220, 233 P.2d 159, 162 (1951), quoted in In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d at 350, 508 P.2d at 724, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
14. 9 Cal. 3d at 350-51 n.8, 508 P.2d at 724 n.8, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 404 n.8.
15. 9 Cal. 3d at 352 n.1, 508 P.2d at 726 n.1, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 406 n.1.
16. See note 105 infra.
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1849, numerous states already had the same or substantially the same

provision. 17 Therefore, by the time California was to consider it, bail
of right in noncapital cases was already a recognized docas a matter
8
trine.'
17. The following states, with dates closest to the time of the California Convention, had substantially the same provision: Alabama (1819), Arkansas (1836), Connecticut (1818), Delaware (1831), Florida (1838), Illinois (1818), Indiana (1816), Iowa
(1846), Kentucky (1799, 1850), Louisiana (1845), Maine (1819), Michigan (1835),
Mississippi (1832), Missouri (1820), New Jersey (1844), North Carolina (1776), Ohio
(1802), Pennsylvania (1776, 1838), Rhode Island (1842), Tennessee (1834), Texas
(1845), Wisconsin (1848). Thus at the time of the California Constitutional Convention of 1849, 22 states had an identical or very similar provision, and only 6 had something different. Of these 6, 4 had provisions similar to the federal Constitution and 2
had no provision at all. See generally, 1-7 F. Thorpe, Tim FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrrUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS (1909) [hereinafter cited
as THORPE].

18. By the ancient common law (circa the Norman conquest of 1066) all felonies
in England were bailable, but the sheriff had broad discretion in granting or denying
bail. Even though murder was made the first statutory exception in the twelfth century,
the law was still very uncertain and sheriffs frequently abused their discretionary powers.
Although the only prescribed statutory exception was for murder, sheriffs denied bail
in other cases where they felt bail ought to be refused, and granted bail when it should
have been denied. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *298. Later statutes altered the
power of the judiciary to grant or deny bail. See, e.g., 11 & 12 Vict., c. 42, § 23
(1848); 7 Geo. IV, c. 64 (1826); 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554); 23 Hen. VI, c. 9
(1444); 3 Edw. I, c. 15 (1275). Thereafter, in some cases no justice could bail. 4
W. BLACKSrONE, COMmENTAR ES *298. For certain other offenses the English judges
had discretion and for a third group of offenses the accused had to be bailed upon offering sufficient sureties, Id. at *299. As a final protection for the accused, King's Bench,
the highest court of England, had the complete discretionary power to grant bail for any
crime whatsoever. Id.
At the time the American colonies were drawing up their charters they were thus
faced with divergent theories and some confusion. Admission to bail was discretionary
for the justices of the King's Bench, but was nondiscretionary in most situations for the
English justices of the peace. The Massachusetts colony in 1641 was the first to provide
that: "It is ordered, and by this Court [legislative body] declared; that no mans person
shall be restreined or imprisoned by any authoritie whatsoever before the Law hath sentenced him thereto: if he can put in sufficient securitie, Bayle or Mainprize for his appearance, and good behaviour in the mean time: unless it be in crimes Capital, and contempt in open Court, and in such cases where some expresse Act of Court doth allow
it." THE LAws AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 28 (1648). New Jersey and Pennsylvania in 1682 opted to follow the example set by Massachusetts by providing "jithat
all prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses, where
the proof is evident, or the presumption great. . . ." LEAMING & SPICER, GRANTS AND
CONCESSIONS OF NEW JERSEY, 1664-1702, at 235 (1881); FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF
PENNsYLvANrA-1682, reprintedin 5 THORPE, supra note 17, at 3061.
In 1787 the Northwest Ordinance, Act of Aug. 7, 1787, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 52n(a)
(1787), guaranteed an absolute right to bail in noncapital cases with a provision almost
identical to that of Pennsylvania and New Jersey set forth over 100 years before.
Hence by the time of the first Congress, the American trend towards a fixed absolute
right of bail was already well advanced. Notwithstanding that the federal Constitution
did not contain the same provision, but merely prohibited excessive bonds, the Judiciary
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There was very little debate regarding the provision at the convention itself. During the first discussion of the bill of rights, the
excessive bail provision was adopted. 19 Later, on September 28, 1849,
a delegate proposed the current section and it was accepted with only
The proposing delegate's comments are instructive
minor debate."
on the provision's meaning:
It has been thought by some that the section which we have just
adopted [excessive bail clause] covers this entire ground; but in
my opinion it does not. This section is a part of the common law,
and as we have not adopted the common law, and perhaps may
not, I think it very necessary that such a section should be introduced, so that in all cases, except capital offenses, where -the proof
is evident or the presumption great, the party accused shall be entitled to bail. An innocent man may21be kept in prison and refused
bail, without such a provision as this.
Of course California did accept the common law but the concern expressed above in requesting that the constitution expressly state
that all offenses shall be bailable, except for capital offenses, echoed
the concern of those in the early colonies. These early colonies were
agitated about the infringement of their rights by England and were
leery of any such infringements by their own government. Thus, one
of the main objects in drafting the early state constitutions was to
limit government's power, especially in the area of individual rights.
The power of the government, through the courts, to deny an individual bail and thereby imprison him without trial could clearly be a severe governmental infringement on the rights of its citizens. Specific
limitations on this discretionary power of the courts were thus promulgated to insure protection of the right to bail.
A further indication of the restrictions to be placed on the courts,
and one which showed the resolve of the people of California, concerned the latter clause of article I, section 6: "when the proof is evident or the presumption great." The delegates at the convention, in
voting against a proposed deletion of this clause,2 2 thought that permitting a denial of bail in all capital cases could lead to a great injustice-i.e., detaining a person arrested for a capital offense even though
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 91, did provide for nondiscretionary bail as did an

increasing number of state constitutional provisions.

Pennsylvania and North Carolina

included the provision in their constitutions even prior to the adoption of the federal
Constitution. PA. CONST. § 28 (1776), reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 17, at 3089;
N.C. CONST. art. XXXIX (1776), reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 17, at 2793.
Thus, while the federal Constitution did not patently prescribe the right to bail in
noncapital cases, the states continued to provide for it explicitly.

19. J. BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON
THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION 41 (1850).
20.

Id. at 293.

21.

Id. (emphasis added).

22.

Id.
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the evidence against him was insufficient. In 1879 when the constitution was finally adopted the provision was left intact.
It is also instructive to examine judicial construction of article T,
section 6 shortly after it was enacted. Such interpretations of constitutional provisions near the time of their adoption are generally held to
be strong evidence of their true meaning.23 In Ex parte Duncan,24 an
1879 case, the court held that the right of a prisoner to be admitted
to bail upon several noncapital indictments was guaranteed by the express words of the constitution. People v. Tinder25 (1862) and Ex
parte Ruef20 (1908) also reached the result that admission to bail in

noncapital cases is a right of the accused which no court can lawfully
refuse.
Unreasonable restrictions and arbitrariness in granting or denying
bail were typical examples of the invasions of personal liberty by the
British Crown which the American colonists found intolerable to the
point of revolution. It is not surprising, therefore, that in drafting
their bail provisions, the states were careful to guard against
such abuses in the future. In light of this history, each state's constitutional provisions ought to be accorded reasonably liberal interpretation, in harmony with both the language and the evident purpose and
policy of the provision:
[Bail gives] full fealty to the basic principles of freedom, inherent
in our system, that an accused is presumed to be innocent until his
guilt is established . . . beyond a reasonable doubt, it reconciles

a sound administration of justice with the rights of the accused to
be free from harassment and confinement, unhampered in the
preparation of27 his defense and not subjected to punishment prior
to conviction.
At the time of the adoption of the California Constitution, the
constitutions of twenty-two other states contained basically the same
provision as California was considering.28 Since that time seventeen
more have included a nondiscretionary bail provision in -their constitutions. 2 Thus, only ten states do not have bail as a matter of right
23. Knowles v. Yates, 31 Cal. 83, 89 (1866).
24. 54 Cal. 75 (1879).
25. 19 Cal. 539, 542 (1862).
26. 8 Cal. App. 468, 469, 97 P. 89, 90 (1908). See also In re Westcott, 93 Cal.
App. 575, 576, 270 P. 247, 248 (1928).
27. Dudley v. United States, 242 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1957).
28. See note 17 supra.
29. Ariz. (1912) art. II, § 22; Colo. (1876) art. II, § 19; Ida. (1889) art. I, § 6;
Kan. (1858) art. I, § 9; Minn. (1857) art. I, § 7; Mont. (1889) art. III, § 19; Neb.
(1866-67) art. I, § 9; Nev. (1864) art. I, § 7; N.M. (1912) art. II, § 13; N.D. (1889)
art. I, § 6; Okla. (1907) art. 11, § 8; Ore. (1857) art. I, § 14; S.C. (1868) art. I, § 20;
S.D. (1889) art. 6, § 8; Utah (1895) art. I, § 8; Wash. (1889) art. I, § 20; Wyo.
(1889) art. I, § 14.
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in noncapital cases as a constitutional guarantee. Of these, four provide for the right by statute,3" two have no provision3 and the other
four have an excessive bail provision similar to the one in the federal
Constitution."
In addition, while the federal government guarantee of right to bail under the Eighth Amendment is still hotly debated,
at least some of the pressure was relieved by passage of the Bail Reform
Act of 1966 " which also provided for bail as a statutory matter of
right in all noncapital federal cases.
In Arizona, which has the same bail provision as California, but
with one additional exception,34 an appellate court held that the bail
provision was mandatory, not merely directory and hence discretionary--" Colorado with an identical provision 0 also held that the provision was mandatory.3 7 While the court may entertain testimony as to
the circumstances surrounding the felonious charge for the purpose of
determining the amount of bail, the right to bail cannot be denied except in capital crimes.
Nor do any of the states having provisions like California's allow
for denial of bail because the accused may pose as a threat to the public safety. As will be illustrated, such an exception is contrary to the
basic purpose of bail and to the constitutional provision. Historically,
in all these states, the right of the individual to bail before trial is a
fundamental one. The Wyoming Supreme Court in State v. Crocker"8
stated the purpose as follows:
It must be borne in mind that our laws are intended to be framed
upon the humane idea that no man is to be punished until he has
been convicted; that an accused is only confined in jail before trial
and conviction to secure his presence at the trial, and, if convicted,
that he may be compelled to undergo sentence; that, however, if
by sureties his presence can as well be secured, it is deemed wise
and just that he shall, until trial and conviction, be allowed his lib30. ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.010 (1970); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 709-3, 4 (shall be
bailable . . . unless for offenses punishable by imprisonment for life not subject to
parole . . . . ); MD. ANN. CODE RULES OF PROC. 777 § a (1971); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. ch. 597:1 (Supp. 1972).
31. No provision: Georgia and Vermont.
32. Excessive bail provision: MAss. CONST. art. XXVI; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5
(however, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 530.20, 510.30 (McKinney 1971) provides for
limited discretion); VA. CONST. art. I, § 9; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5.
33. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-52 (1970).
34. ARiz. CONST. art. 2, § 22 (as amended Nov. 3, 1970); see note 119 infra.
35. State v. Garrett, 16 Ariz. App. 427, 493 P.2d 1232 (1972).
36. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 19.
37. Palmer v. District Court, 156 Colo. 284, 398 P.2d 435 (1965). The court
in Palmer said, "The mention of the one exception [capital offenses] excludes other exceptions. Courts would violate their mandate if they were to add another to the exception expressed in the . . . provision." Id. at 287, 398 P.2d at 437.
38. 5 Wyo. 385, 40 P. 681 (1895).
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erty, except in capital offenses, where the proof is evident or the
presumption great, in which cases it is deemed that the offense is
so grave it is not safe to allow -the presence of the accused to be
secured by bail. 39
Therefore it is not unreasonable to accept the proposition that if
so many states have this same constitutional bail provision, which derives from the very origins of civil government in this country, that
provision should be regarded as serving a fundamental and commonly
recognized philosophy and function. The function is obvious: to assure that the defendant will not flee the jurisdiction. As Bishop
stated it:
[The danger of escape] is the only just ground for denying bail
to one accused of any crime, yet not convicted. But something of
such danger exists in every case, and it increases with the severity
of the punishment and the probability of a conviction. Always,
therefore, these two elements should, in combination, be taken into
the account on the questions of accepting bail and the amount.
And where the probabilities of flight are overwhelming, there
should be no bail. Thus, [a capital crime,] with guilt and conviction certain, is of this sort; for, in the ' 40language of Scripture, "all
that a man hath will he give for his life."
If the purpose of bail is solely to assure the presence of accused
at trial41 then all other reasons for denying it come in direct conflict
with the constitutional guarantee. The early colonies realized what
a morass the administration of bail had become: discretionary in
some cases by some judges, that discretion oftentimes abused, the purpose of it somewhat obscured by improper application. Thus, when it
came time to draft bail provisions for the state constitutions the drafters wanted to define the right explicitly, maximizing the individual's
right and minimizing the possibility of legislative and judicial encroachment of that right. Indeed, it is very significant that these early constifor by
tutions did not limit the bail provisions to the coverage provided
42
the federal Constitution-that of the excessive bail clause.
Thus, in the overwhelming majority of the thirty-nine states which
provide for the constitutional right to bail (including California after
In re Underwood) the legal effect is definite and well settled: all offenses
are bailable as a matter of right, except those which are considered
Id. at 391, 40 P. at 687.
NEw CRIMINmA PROCEDURE § 255, at 154-55 (4th ed. 1895).
41. In re Petersen, 51 Cal. 2d 177, 181, 331 P.2d 24, 27 (1958). See also McDermott v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 693, 695, 493 P.2d 1161, 1163, 100 Cal. Rptr.
297, 299 (1972) (no suggestion of revenue to the government nor of punishment to the
surety in granting bail); accord, Sawyer v. Barbour, 142 Cal. App. 2d 827, 833, 300
P.2d 187, 190 (1956).
42. See generally Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L.
REv. 959 (1965).
39.

40. 1 1. BISHOP,
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"capital"; and even those so considered are bailable unless the proof is
43
evident or the presumption great.

Implications of the Decision-Parameters of the Right
In light of the foregoing discussion, the question becomes: Is
bail in noncapital cases an absolute right, or, if not, are there any
constitutionally acceptable limitations on the right?
At the outset it is universally recognized that no right, no matter
how guaranteed or by how high an authority, is absolute. Since all
rights may be subject to abuse there must be some provisions to anticipate the abuses. Often this problem is solved by a balancing of possible conflicting rights and recognizing that certain ones may take precedence over others. 44 Likewise rights and privileges may be waived.
For example, one may waive the Fifth Amendment privilege by testifying against his best interests. Similarly, the right to bail may be
43. People v. Tinder, 19 Cal. 539 (1862). Significantly, this right is included in
most state constitutions in the portion denominated the "Bill of Rights." These sections
were the repository of those rights most cherished and zealously guarded by the delegates of the various state constitutional conventions.
44. Provisions of the state's constitution are mandatory and prohibitory unless expressly declared to be otherwise. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 22; see Jenkins v. Knight, 46
Cal. 2d 220, 224, 293 P.2d 6, 8 (1956). This rule applies, however, to all sections of
the constitution alike and to everyone subject to the mandate of the constitution. Santa
Clara County v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 2d 552, 554, 203 P.2d 1, 2 (1949). A problem
may arise when two sections of the constitution appear to be in conflict. For instance,
article I, section 6, says "[a]ll persons shall be bailable . . . unless for capital offenses . . ." but article I, section 1, recognizes that "[aill people . . . have certain
inalienable rights, among which are . . . obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy"
(emphasis added).
Although there could be an apparent conflict between the right of an accused to
be released on bail and the right of another to obtain safety and happiness, the conflict
is resolved. Where the language used in a constitutional provision plainly and unequivocally shows a definite and certain purpose to be accomplished, courts must construe
it so as to carry that purpose into effect. Boca Mill Co. v. Curry, 154 Cal. 326, 338,
97 P. 1117, 1123 (1908). Clearly article I, section 6, provides that all persons shall
be bailable for noncapital offenses upon sufficient sureties. The terms and conditions
are neither vague nor ambiguous, whereas article I, section 1, is open to broader interpretation. It is universally held that when constitutional provisions cannot reasonably be
construed to avoid a conflict, the constitutional provision which is more specific prevails.
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 596, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 609
(1971).
Assuming, arguendo, that there is a conflict between the two provisions, article I,
section 6 bail provision is very specific and article I, section 1 purposely left unspecific, so the bail provision must prevail. However, it is submitted that the bail provision
does not stand in conflict with the article I, section 1 guarantees, but rather fulfills
part of its promise-that we will remain free from government oppression. If it were
a matter of the state's discretion to detain people without bail, then everyone could be
faced with unreasonable or arbitrary arrest and detention.
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waived by the person submitting to incarceration rather than posting
bond.
Accepting the proposition that the right to bail may be qualified
under appropriate circumstances, one must then inquire as to what
those circumstances are. In In re Underwood, the court was forced
to confront the constitutionality of one such qualification that had begun to creep into some decisions-that bail is a matter of right in all
noncapital cases except where for the safety of the individual or for the
protection of society it would be proper to deny bail.45 This rather
striking exception to mandatory release on bail must be scrutinized.
The first case to depart from the traditional interpretation was In
re Henley.4 6 There, the defendant was arrested on a warrant stating
that he was "so far addicted to the intemperate use of stimulants as to
have lost the power of self-control, ' 47 and that because of such condition he should be committed to a state hospital. The court, although
holding that the petitioner should be admitted to bail pending an examination, stated that "there might be some instances where for the safety
of the individual or of society it would be proper to deny bail, but unless such a showing is made, the [constitutional prohibition] should be
held to apply. '48 The court observed that the instances could only exist under the statute and they could not be in conflict with the constitutional guarantees. From this bit of dictum, the case was subsequently cited for the proposition that a public safety exception to bail
exists. However, analysis reveals that the essence of the holding was
concerned with a civil commitment situation.
In re Westcott, 49 while quoting In re Henley as saying that there
may be some situtations where the defendant could be detained, held
otherwise. There, defendant was twice convicted of murder but both
convictions were reversed on appeal. The second reversal was due to
insufficiency of the evidence, and therefore within coverage of the bail
provision. Prior to the third trial the court ruled that he was entitled
to have bail fixed and to be released because there was nothing to indicate that additional evidence would be produced by the prosecution.
Furthermore, one's right to bail is not affected by the fact that he may
be insane. 50 In re Gentry51 also quoted In re Henley, but again the
45.

See, e.g., Bean v. County of Los Angeles, 252 Cal. App. 2d 754, 60 Cal. Rptr.

804 (1967).
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
and thus
sufficient

18 Cal. App. 1, 121 P. 933 (1912).
Id. at 2, 121 P. at 934.
Id. at 5, 121 P. at 935 (dictum).
93 Cal. App. 575, 270 P. 247 (1928).
In re Westcott was also concerned with the questionable sanity of the accused
he might have been detained by use of the civil commitment provisions, if a
showing of his insanity had been made. Id. at 576-77, 270 P. at 248 (dic-

tum).
51.

206 Cal. App. 2d 723, 24 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1962).
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holding was not based on the principle enunciated in Henley. The
Gentry court held that the right to bail pending trial is not lost by the
entry of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Evans v. Municipal Court52 was a case concerning an inebriate.
The court in citing Henley, Gentry and Westcott said that "[i]t has
been suggested that either for the safety of the individual or for the protection of society, it may be proper in some instances to deny bail.""3
The court went on to hold that the appellant's "condition of inebriation
allowed the officer discretion in refusing to release appellant immediately on bail if. . . to do so would endanger the appellant or society."5
In that case the detaining official did not act unreasonably if he released defendant as soon as it reasonably appeared that he was no
longer under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 55
In specifically overruling these cases insofar as they created a
public safety exception to the right to bail, the court in Underwood explicitly rejected the notion that the right to bail could be qualified by a
potential threat to society. Thus implicit, if not explicit, in the decision is the recognition that bail is an absolute right prior to trial for
noncapital offenses with but one limitation. That limitation-risk of
flight-is so inextricably woven into the concept of bail that without it,
bail would be meaningless. The right to bail means that the accused
has the right to pretrial liberty on such bond in such amount as in the
judgment of the trial court will insure his appearance at the trial. If,
however, the court is satisfied from the evidence presented on the application for bail that regardless of the amount of bail fixed, the accused, if released, will probably flee to avoid trial, bail may be denied. 50
There is one other limitation on the right which, although Underwood would seemingly exclude it, could have enough justification
that it would not be inconsistent with proscription of the "public
safety" exception. That limitation would occur when the accused engages in intimidating and threatening conduct in trying to prevent witnesses from testifying against him. The distinction here lies in the
public policy served. The power to protect witnesses is necessary
to prevent the disruption of the judicial process that might be occa52. 207 Cal. App. 2d 633, 24 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1962).
53. Id. at 636, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 635 (emphasis added).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. It should be noted that the suggestion of an exception in these cases appears
somewhat unnecessary. That is, all of the cases could have had a valid constitutional
solution if they had been based on the civil commitment of the defendant, rather than
on a newly created exception to the constitutional right to bail.
56. State v. Johnson, 61 N.J. 351, 294 A.2d 245 (1972); Cohen v. United States,
82 S. Ct. 8 (1961) (Douglas, Circuit J.); Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325,
296 A.2d 829 (1972).
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sioned if witnesses, as a result of threats and intimidation, refused to
appear at trials. Thus, this qualification is actually based on the inherent power of the court to manage the conduct of a trial and to insure
the fair administration of justice.57
Capital v. Noncapital Offenses: Elimination of Death Penalty
The bail provision does not stand for the proposition that bail is
a matter of right for "capital offenses when the proof is evident or the
presumption great."5 s Traditionally, bail is discretionary for pretrial
release in capital cases of this nature.59 However, two questions are
raised: What constitutes a capital offense, and what happens if the
death penalty is eliminated? If the only legitimate purpose for denying bail in capital cases is the great risk of flight by -the accused when
his alternative is possible death, then if he no longer faces that alternative, the reason for the denial of bail exception is vitiated. Whatever
the intended reason for the clause, the language itself must still be analyzed, especially in light of the modem -trend away from the death
penalty.
The primary inquiry is to ascertain what is meant by a capital offense. A Kansas court which allowed bail in a "capital" case, after
that state by statute reduced the death penalty to life imprisonment,
stated:
In all [the state] constitutions the word "capital" had a definite,
settled meaning, which was the meaning accorded the word in general usage whenever employed as an adjective qualifying the terms
crime, offense, or felony-punishable by deprivation of life. Doctor Johnson's definition is a sentence from Bacon, "That which affects life." 60
57. See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 425 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Sica v.
United States, 82 S. Ct. 669 (1962) (Douglas, Circuit I.) (defendant admitted to bail
despite his record for violence and his alleged threatening conduct toward witnesses;
showing of necessity to protect witnesses not sufficient); Carbo v. United States, 82 S.
Ct. 662 (1962) (Douglas, Circuit J.) (defendant denied bail as strong evidence shown
he had threatened witnesses and in prior trial one key witness died and another disappeared); Fernandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642 (1961) (Harlan, Circuit J.); FED.
R. CRIM. P. 46(b), as amended, (Supp. 1973). California may have provided for this
situation by CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6 which states, "Witnesses shall not be unreasonably
detained. . . ." Although this appears to be a provision to prevent the court from detaining witnesses against their will, it could arguably be used to show that because of
the serious threats posed by accused against the witnesses it had the same effect as unreasonably detaining them, especially if it is necessary to have them put into protective
custody.
58. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6; In re Troia, 64 Cal. 152, 28 P. 231 (1883); In re
Page, 82 Cal. App. 576, 578, 255 P. 887, 888 (1927).
59. People v. Tinder, 19 Cal. 539 (1862); cf. Ex parte Wolff, 57 Cal. 94 (1880)
(defendant charged with abortion killing; no intent to kill and therefore not first degree
murder; hence no death penalty and offense bailable as a matter of right).
60. In re Ball, 106 Kan. 536, 538, 188 P. 424, 425 (1920).
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It was not a matter of whether the death penalty had to be rendered, but rather whether it was a possible sentence. An Alabama
court, in considering the problem said that "[t]he question . . . was
not whether the accused must necessarily be punished with death,-because this [the magistrates] could not know until after the trial,-but
whether he might be so punished, and probably would be under the
proof."'" If the jury has the power of saying, in cases of murder in the
first degree, whether the accused shall suffer death or go to the penitentiary for life, then capital punishment still remains, and bail may
still be denied. But if the punishment may no longer be death then a
different situation arises.
There appear to be two different courses taken by the states as
they eliminate the death penalty either by legislative enactment or judicial decision.6 2 The Connecticut Supreme Court in 1972 held that
even though the accused was held on three counts of murder, if he
gave sufficient surety for his later court appearance, he was entitled
to bail and release as he was not being detained for an offense punishable by death. 63 The Arizona Supreme Court, basing its decision on
the fact that the United States Supreme Court had struck down the
death penalty,64 said that the defendant charged with first degree murder must be released on bail. 65 Maryland was in accord with the
foregoing, holding that while the trial court had discretion in setting the
amount of bail for one accused of murder, the accused was still entitled to be admitted to bail before conviction as a matter of right.,6
An Ohio appellate court recently held that all defendants shall be allowed bail due to the Furman decision 67 even though the state constitution says "[a]ll persons shall be bailable . . . except for capital offenses," 6 basing this holding on'69the fact that a capital offense is
"one where death may be imposed.
61. Ex parte McCrary, 22 Ala. 65, 71 (1853); accord, In re Berry, 198 Wash.
317, 88 P.2d 427 (1939).
62. Presently the death penalty has been totally abolished in the following states:

Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon,
Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin; and with some exceptions in California, Georgia,
New Mexico, New York and Rhode Island.
63. State v. Aillon, 295 A.2d 666 (1972); accord, State v. Johnson, 61 N.J. 351,
294 A.2d 245 (1972); State v. Pett, 253 Minn. 429, 92 N.W.2d 205 (1958); In re Perry,
19 Wisc. 711, 712 (1865) ("The court are of opinion that since the abolition of capital

punishment in this state, persons charged with murder are in all cases bailable").
64.

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).

65.

In re Tarr, 109 Ariz. 264, 508 P.2d 728 (1973).

66.

McLaughlin v. Warden of Baltimore City Jail, 16 Md. App. 451, 298 A.2d

201 (1973).
67.

68.
69.

Edinger v. Metzger, 32 Ohio App. 2d 263, 290 N.E.2d 577 (1972).
OHIo CoNsT. art. I, § 9.
Edinger v. Metzger, 32 Ohio App. 2d 263, 264, 290 N.E.2d 577, 578 (1972).
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Louisiana expressed the opposing view in State v. Flood," holding that even after the Supreme Court decision, constitutional provisions
concerning bail need not be changed. Thus, offenses classified as
capital before that decision were still to be classified as capital offenses, and those charged with an offense punishable by death before
Furman would not be entitled to bail, even though the death penalty

itself was eliminated. 71

Mississippi used a slightly different rationale to uphold denial of
bail in a capital case. The supreme court of that state held that a

capital case is any case where permissible punishment prescribed by
the legislature is death even though such penalty may not be inflicted
as a result of the Supreme Court's decision. 72 This is not exactly the
opposite side, because! the offense was still considered "capital" in
Mississippi. This leads to the conclusion that if the death penalty

were eliminated in Mississippi either by its7 3legislature or by its courts,
then the offense would probably be bailable.
The California Supreme Court in People v. Anderson74 struck

down the death penalty as being cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the California Constitution. A petition for rehearing was filed
on the question of whether bail should be denied as formerly in mur-

der cases where guilt is evident or the presumption is great. By way
of a footnote the court said the offense was still murder, even though
the death penalty could no longer be exacted. The court therefore

felt that, subject to future consideration, former capital offenses would
70. 263 La. 700, 269 So. 2d 212 (1972).
71. Cf. People ex rel. Dunbar v. District Court, 500 P.2d 358 (Colo. 1972)
(Supreme Court decision prohibiting the death penalty did not preclude denial of bail
to defendants charged with five counts of murder in the first degree by arson).
72. Hudson v. McAdory, 268 So. 2d 916 (Miss. 1972).
73. Compare what occurred in the state of Washington. In a case arising after
the state had abolished the death penalty, the court said, "Since there is now no capital
punishment in this state, there are no capital offenses . . . ." State v. Johnson, 83
Wash. 1, 3, 144 P. 944, 945 (1914). In a subsequent case, the court said, "The test
to be applied in determining whether an offense is a capital one, within the meaning
of the constitution or statute, is not whether the death penalty must necessarily be imposed, but whether it may be imposed." In re Berry, 198 Wash. 317, 319, 88 P.2d 427,
428 (1939). The two cases appear to be inconsistent, but they are not. Washington
abolished capital punishment in 1913 and restored it in 1919.
Since death is still a possible penalty in Washington, that state's supreme court was
justified in holding in a post-Furman case that under the Washington statute conferring
right to bail pending appeal except in capital cases, judicial abolition of the death penalty
did not entitle defendant to bail pending appeal from conviction for first degree murder.
State v. Haga, 81 Wash. 2d 704, 504 P.2d 787 (1972). The court in Haga overruled
lohnson to the extent it was inconsistent with Haga and agreed with the reasoning of
Berry.
74. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958
(1972).
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continue to be nonbailable "when the proof of guilt is evident or the
presumption thereof great. ' 7' This is clearly distinguishable from the
Mississippi case discussed above, 76 because in Mississippi the state
through its legislative acts and constitutional provisions still prescribed
the death penalty for certain crimes. The United States Supreme
Court merely forbade the execution of such a penalty. Therefore,
Mississippi's decision for continuing to deny bail is logical.

California's position, on the other hand, was not logically sound.
Since the court ruled in Anderson that the death penalty in California
was unconstitutional in all cases, then of course it was saying that the
death penalty could no longer be imposed. If there is no possibility
of death, then by the majority and better view there has been no "capital" offense committed. And if there has been no capital
offense com77
mitted, then bail should be admitted as a matter of right.
The issue is whether it is the offense which is precluded from the
right to bail, or whether it is the possible penalty resulting from that offense that is to be used as the criterion for denying bail. It is submitted that it is the possibility of death as a punishment that is precluded from bail as a matter of right because
it is under these circum78
stances that the risk of flight is so great.
In further support of this reasoning it is a general maxim of constitutional interpretation that exceptions contained in constitutional
provisions are to be narrowly construed. 79 If this is true, then the interpretation follows that only where death is a possible penalty is the
exception to bail as a matter of right applicable.
Even assuming that the constitutional provision regarding "capital offenses" may be open to interpretation," ° legislative enactments
75. Id. at 657 n.45, 493 P.2d at 899 n.45, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 177 n.45.
76. Hudson v. McAdory, 268 So. 2d 916 (Miss. 1972).
77. See also, In re Boyle, 113 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1974).
78. The court applying New Jersey law in United States ex rel. Merritt v. Vukcevich, 339 F. Supp. 779 (N.J. 1972) perceived the distinction. In that case the defendant's conviction for first degree murder and the court's imposition of a life sentence had
been set aside thus precluding the imposition of the death penalty on retrial. Therefore
the court reasoned that the defendant was entitled to release on bail pending retrial (under New Jersey law prior to trial on charge for which the death penalty may be imposed,
bail may be denied; but where death may not be imposed, bail was a matter of right).
The point is that if death is no longer a possible penalty, then the crime is no longer
capital and does not come within the exception of the constitutional guarantee to bail.
See also People v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 219, 110 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1973).
79. Corey v. Knight, 150 Cal. App. 2d 671, 680, 310 P.2d 673, 679 (1957).
80. It apparently had been so interpreted in California in People v. Anderson, 6
Recently, the court in In re
Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
Boyle, 113 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1974), reconsidered the People v. Anderson footnote, and held
that when the defendant's acts are no longer included within the legislatively denominated "capital offenses" he is entitled to bail even though the offense when committed
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thereunder are also relevant; and to the extent that they are not inconsistent with constitutional provisions, they are upheld. Thus the California statutory provision passed in 1872 regarding bail is typical: "A
defendant charged with an offense punishable with death81 cannot be
admitted to bail, when the proof of his guilt is evident and the presumption thereof great .... 82 Another section provides, "If the
charge is for any other offense, he may be admitted to bail before con'
It is felt that the majority in In re Unviction, as a matter of right."83
derwood was incorrect in adding "capital" into its reading of the second statute; i.e. "If the charge is for any other (than a capital) of4 It would be more appropriate to add "If the charges
fense . . ".
are for any other offense (other than one punishable by death), he
may ....
The statute8 5 clearly limits its coverage to offenses "punishable by
death" and whatever can be read into "capital offenses" cannot be read
into "punishable by death." Therefore if the state eliminates the
death penalty it eliminates offenses punishable by death, and that statutory provision 6 has no real meaning and becomes moot. The conclusion then follows that the accused also is entitled to bail by statutory provision as 7a matter of right before conviction if the death penalty is eliminated.
One final point should be discussed to show that continuing to
treat "capital" offenses as capital offenses after the death penalty has
been abolished is unsound and contrary to history. Over the years we
have gradually abolished the death penalty for various offenses. For
example, withcraft, adultery, idolatry, blasphemy, and even being a
would have been so considered. The court specifically did not resolve the question of
the constitutionality of the death penalty. It would appear, however, that if the death
penalty were struck down as unconstitutional, then there would be no capital offenses
and based on the reasoning of In re Boyle the court would be constitutionally compelled
to hold that all criminal offenses would be bailable.
81. In In re Scaggs, 47 Cal. 2d 416, 303 P.2d 1009 (1956), the court held that
before conviction, a defendant charged with a felony not punishable with death is entitled to be admitted to bail as a matter of right.
82.

CAL. PEN.

CODE

§ 1270 (West 1970) (emphasis added).

83. Id. § 1271 (West 1970) (emphasis added).
84. It re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 346, 508 P.2d 721, 722, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401,
402 (1973).
85. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1270 (West 1970).
86. Id.
87. The status of death as a possible penalty is in a state of flux in California.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27 (added Nov. 7, 1972) clearly provides that the death penalty
shall not be deemed to constitute "cruel or unusual punishment within the meaning of
" In an attempt to circumvent the argument of arbitrariness,
Article I, Section 6 ....
CAL. PEN. CODE 9H 190, 190.2 (West Supp. 1974) makes the death penalty mandatory
in specific situations. Whether this attempt to reinstate the death penalty in California
will withstand judicial scrutiny is, at this time, uncertain.
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"stubborn or rebellious son [over sixteen] which [sic] will not obey
the voice of his father"8 8 were, at one time, punishable by death. Because these offenses were once capital, are they still to be treated as
capital after death as a punishment has been removed? Obviously
not, and courts have so held. Given the policy underlying this decision,
it is difficult to understand why removal of the death penalty from
even murder should require any different result.
Present Alternatives
Although In re Underwood clearly denies the constitutionality of
a public safety exception to the right to pretrial bail, it does not solve
the basic problem of how society may effectively protect itself against
potentially dangerous persons. Excluding the public safety exception,
there appear to be three primary alternatives for dealing with such persons: high bail, preventive detention, and civil commitment. While
each of these methods does serve the function of keeping the criminal
separated from society at large, each also contains some serious limitations that prevent it from being a truly effective solution to the problem. In order to understand why it is imperative that another method
of dealing with potential recidivists be found, it will be necessary to
examine first the limitations in those alternatives already proposed.
"Sufficent Sureties": High Money Bail
While it is improper and in excess of a California state court's
jurisdiction to deny bail, either to punish or to preventively detain the
accused, or due to the gravity of his alleged offense, or due to the
alleged criminality of the accused,8 9 it is apparently proper to use some
of these factors in setting the amount of bail.
Generally it has been held that the character and past record of
the accused, the seriousness of and number of crimes for which he is
charged and the penalties attached thereto, and the probability of his
appearance at the trial or hearing of the case may be considered in
fixing the amount of bail.9 0
There is however, an inconsistency in the way the analysis of the
criteria is used. In re Newbern9 ' indicates this inconsistency. There,
the court said, "The only permissible purpose of . . . bail . . . is
88.

Some 200 other offenses were, at one time, punishable by death in England
THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSAC-USIrrS

and 14 others in Massachusetts in 1648;

5 (1648).
89. In re Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 233 P.2d 159 (1951).
90. Bland v. Holden, 21 Ohio St. 2d 238, 257 N.E.2d 397 (1970); In re Newbern,
55 Cal. 2d 500, 360 P.2d 43, 11 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1961); In re Brumback, 46 Cal. 2d
810, 299 P.2d 217 (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1275 (West 1970).

91.

55 Cal. 2d 500, 360 P.2d 43, 11 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1961).
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practical assurance that defendant will attend [trial]." 92 Later, the
same opinion noted that "the magistrate charged with setting the bail is
to consider 'the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his appearing at
the trialor hearingof the case.' "I'
If the sole purpose of bail is to assure attendance of defendant at
trial then the other two factors may be relevant to determine if he will
flee, but they alone should not be used to detain the accused by setting high bail where the circumstances indicate no real risk of flight. It
seems that on the one hand we give a right to bail and eliminate discretion from impinging on that right, and then on the other hand we
emasculate the right by giving broad discretion to the judge in setting
the amount of bail. Clearly, this amount of discretion may result in
a subterfuge of the real purpose of bail since realistically judges may
be prone to be subjective in setting the amount of bail. Indeed the
"public safety" is the reason most often given for increasing the
amount of bail to the point where the defendant cannot produce it and
is therefore detained.14 According to a survey conducted by a noted
authority in -thefield, if the amount of bail is placed at or above $5,000
some 87 percent of the defendants would be unable to produce bail.9"
Thus the whole right to bail would basically be subverted if the judges
would or could set bail at $5,000 for each defendant.
Hence, while the stated reason for setting high bail is to prevent
a defendant from fleeing, the subrosa and oftentimes not so subrosa
reason is to protect the "public safety." As we have seen, the "public
safety" exception to bail as a matter of right is unconstitutional. 96 In
short, high bail is not justified simply because the defendant's character
is "bad";
there is no presumption from this alone that he is apt to
97
flee.
Even if the reasons for setting bail were scrupulously adhered to,
high bail may come under constitutional attack for a number of other
reasons. Although it is generally held that the ability to pay is not to
be a factor in the setting of bail,9" the United States Supreme Court may
92. Id. at 504, 360 P.2d at 45, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 549 (emphasis added).
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. See Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1954).
95. Id. at 1033. Even if it is set as low as $500 up to 1/3 of the defendants may
be unable to post bail. It should be noted, however, that these figures are 20 years old
and do not reflect current inflation.
96. In re Underwood, 9 Cal. 3d 345, 508 P.2d 721, 107 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1973).
97. Hairston v. United States, 343 F.2d 313, 314-15 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (dissenting
opinion). See also Palmer v. District Court, 156 Colo. 284, 398 P.2d 435 (1965);
Hobbs v. Lindsey, 240 Ind. 74, 162 N.E.2d 85 (1959).
98. White v. United States, 330 F.2d 811 (8th Cir. 1964); Pilkinton v. Circuit
Court, 324 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1963); Ex parte Paul, 36 Okla. Crim. 86, 252 P. 853
(1927).
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have portended eventual elimination of that idea. In Griffin v. Illinois99 the Court ruled that indigents must be afforded as adequate an
appellate review as defendants who have enough money to buy trial
transcripts, stating, "There can be no equal justice where the kind of
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."' 10 0 The
"kind of trial a man gets" is directly related to his ability to prepare his
defense, and this is directly related to his being at liberty to find possible witnesses, assist his attorney in ascertaining the facts, etc. 10 1 Therefore it is not unreasonable to deduce that an indigent should have the
same right to pretrial release as the wealthy have.
In reality, under the present system he does not. If Professor
Foote is correct in his figures, then even so much as $500 bail has an
enormous impact on whether a poor man may be released on bail,
while obviously it does not have the same effect on the wealthy. Indeed, the professional hired gun, the racketeer and others who present
the greatest danger to society inevitably are able to post bond, while
the monetarily less fortunate languish in jail and consequently have a
much higher rate of conviction. 102 In addition, money bail also has
other very serious effects on the indigent: although he is the least able
to shoulder the burden of loss, he typically suffers temporary disruption or permanent loss of employment, family relationships and other
ties to the community. This is especially unjust and unrealistic in furthering the goals of the judicial function of government when there
are less restrictive and equally effective alternatives.
The burden on the individual is clear. The burden on society,
while more difficult to perceive, is nevertheless significant. Frequently,
those individuals who have been unable to post bond, and have subsequently lost their jobs, become an even greater burden on society
when they are released. They join the roles of the unemployed and
have a better chance of entering (or returning to) a life of crime.
Preventive Detention
Certainly the most widely discussed alternative to bail as matter of
right is preventive detention. While the subject of preventive detention is extensively documented, it is also highly susceptible to subjective reasoning and emotional response. In short, the factual determinations regarding the effectiveness of preventive detention are at best
insufficient and at worst misleading. Depending on what view a par99. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
100. Id. at 19.
101. See generally Wald, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical
Study, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 631 (1964).
102. Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 641, 642-43

(1964).
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ticular author subscribes to, the figures on preventive detention seem
flexible enough to prove his or her point. 10 3
It is beyond the scope of this note to engage in a lengthy discus103. For example, one senator, who is evidently a proponent of preventive detention where there is a threat to the public safety, pointed out that NATIONAL BUREAU OF
STANDARDS, COMPILATION AND USE OF CRIMINAL COURT DATA IN RELATION TO PRETRIAL RELEASE OF DEFENDANTS: A PILOT STUDY 535 (1970) indicated "that 25 percent
of persons charged with dangerous crimes and 17 percent of those charged with violent
crimes can be expected to be rearrested for further crime while on pretrial release.
These figures must be further adjusted to reflect the fact that many crimes are not reported to the police, and that only 30 percent of reported crimes, even, result in arrest
and criminal charges." 116 CONG. REc. 24893 (1970) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
This senator is using the figures to show that they are high enough to indicate that
"crime committed by persons on court-ordered release, or bail recidivism, is of large
enough proportion to be considered of major consequence to law enforcement." Id. See
also Younger, It's Time to Forfeit Bail, 5 Sw. L. REv. 262 (1973). Younger recognized
that "data on crimes by persons awaiting trial is not unlike other emotionally-impacted
criminal justice information in that . . .it seems to depend a great deal on who one
asks." Id. at 274. He then goes on to conclude that by doubling the above figures,
"it seems reasonable to estimate that about 22 percent of all defendants commit crimes
while awaiting trial and that this figure climbs to 50 percent for the 'dangerous' group
" Id. The problem with the data as set forth, is that it is the product of "func.
tional guesses," id. at 270, and postulations with very little factual evidence to back it
up. Senator Ervin has a different interpretation of the same study: "The study shows
that, overall, 17 percent of all persons charged with a felony and released on bail are
rearrested, but only 7 percent are rearrested for a second felony. When these persons
are considered according to the distinctions of 'violent-nonviolent' crimes . . . only 5
percent of those originally charged with a violent crime are rearrested for another violent crime." 116 CONG. REc. 10825 (1970). Senator Ervin points out: "It must
be stressed that these figures are for arrest only, and arrest is not the equivalent of a
determination of guilt. It is only a determination by the police that there is probable
cause to arrest. . . . Applying [the] conviction rate [66-2/3 percent] against the rearrest figures, we get true recidivism rates of 6 percent for all felonies, less than 4 percent for 'violent' crimes, and less than 4 percent for 'dangerous' crimes." Id. (emphasis
added). "In practical terms, this means that under [a] preventive detention scheme,
a judge will have to find the one person out of every 16 who will recommit a felony,
the one person out of every 25 who will commit a second so-called violent crime, and
the one person out of every 25 who will commit a second so-called dangerous crime."
Id.
Of course the necessary implication of the above figures is that there is a great likelihood that innocent people will suffer wrongful detention. Although there are other
studies of preventive detention, the particular study referred to merits study for at least
one major reason-initially it was intended to show the need for preventive detention,
while in fact it apparently revealed a quite different story. Indeed, the Bureau of Standards study in its executive summary warned: "The reader is particularly cautioned
against a casual use of the averages reported in this executive summary, since the richness of the narrative supporting material in the court records and the judgmental decisions of persons in the administration of justice require an interpretive summary to accompany each result. The reader is urged to probe deeply in the body of the report
to insure proper interpretation and use of the numerical results presented here." NATrONAL BUREAu OF STANDARDS, COMPILATION AND USE OF CRIMINAL COURT DATA IN RELATION TO PRE-TRIAL RELEASE OF DEFENDANTS: A PILOT STUDY 535 (1970).
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sion of the merits or disadvantages of preventive detention. However,
since preventive detention in California, as well as other states which
have similar constitutional bail provisions, can only be implemented by
constitutional amendment it becomes necessary to consider whether
that alteration of our basic system is advisable. In order to justify a
constitutional amendment it is submitted that it must clearly be shown
that preventive detention is not in violation of federal constitutional
rights, that it is necessary to protect society, and that it is in fact effective.
The objection to preventive detention has primarily centered
around its possible violation of the Eighth, Fifth, and the Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution.10 4 However, there are also a
number of practical reasons for opposition to it. First, the preventive detention procedures would add additional burdens to a court system already near the breaking point. Second, preventive detention
would swell the jail population with untried individuals. Third, it
would merely cover up inadequacies within our judicial system and
lead to further unwise and harmful delay in seeking real solutions to
the problem of crime. Finally, it is simply impossible to predict accurately which of the persons arrested will commit further crimes if released.' 06
One of the most serious practical effects of preventive detention
is the impact that it has on the individual. If two men are convicted
of the same crime and appear before the same judge for sentencing,
the mere fact that one has been a free man up to that point and the
other in jail since arrest should not affect the punishment that either receives. Yet there is a steadily accumulating body of evidence showing
that it does; i.e., that persons released on bail are more likely to be released on probation than are detained persons." 6 Moreover, authori104.
105.

See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 18840 (1970) (remarks of Senator Young).
See generally Wald, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical

Study, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 631 (1964); Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice
in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371 (1970).

A study of recidivist de-

fendants showed that apparently there was no discernable pattern upon which a judge
could rely in determining whom to release. Hearings on Amendments to the Federal
Bail Reform Act of 1966 Before the Subcom. on Const. Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (testimony of P.M. Wald). This leads
to the conclusion that since the judge cannot accurately predict who might be a recidivist
defendant (and hence a danger to society), then nothing can possibly be gained by giving him that discretion.
106. See, e.g., The Bail Reform System of the District of Columbia, Report of the
Committee on the Administration of Bail of the Junior Bar Section of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia 40 (1963) (25% of bailed people and 6% of detained
sample got probation); Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim
Report On The Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L. Ra'v. 67, 87-88 (1963)

59%

of defendants with pretrial release on own recognizance were found not guilty, 23%
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ties recognize that pretrial detention impairs adequate preparation for
trial; thus, detained defendants are -more likely to be convicted because of an inadequate defense. A defendant free on bail or on his
own recognizance can make good use of his time preparing for trial by
locating witnesses favorable to his defense, by tracking down evidentiary leads, and by assisting his attorney in time-consuming pretrial
0
preparation. 1°

Suffice it to say that given some definitely known facts, some realistic assumptions and certain fundamental rights, we should strive to
find alternatives that are more viable than preventive detention. The
effectiveness of preventive detention is doubtful; its constitutionality is
questionable and its impact on society in general should cause apprehension. There are other ways to shorten the time between arrest
and trial and to supervise the accused who may be dangerous-the
goals of preventive detention. These are the preferable alternativesthe ones which do not involve -the potential abuses of individual rights
that mark preventive detention.
Civil Commitment
Most proponents of preventive detention point in particular to
suspects who have problems associated with narcotics, mental stability
or chronic alcoholism. These particular persons seem to pose one of
the clearest threats to the public safety, and the proponents argue
that they should be preventively detained. If the magnitude of their
problems is such that they pose a danger to society, then they also
probably pose a threat to their own well-being and safety. If this is
true, there is a statutory remedy that is constitutionally sound-civil
commitment. However, as was said in People v. Smith: 08
[While] a state [generally] need only show a rational connection
between distinotions drawn by a statute and the legitimate purpose
thereof to uphold its constitutionality . . . closer scrutiny is afforded a statute which affects a fundamental interest. The state's
power -to order the involuntary commitment of a person suspected
of being a danger to the public is a proper case in which to impose
upon the state the more onerous burden of demonstrating that there
exists a compelling interest and that the distinction is necessary to
further that purpose.
If it is remembered that these commitment statutes are of a civil
of detained defendants were found not guilty; prison sentences were given to 21% of
defendants with pretrial "own recognizance" and to 96% of detained defendants).
107. See, e.g., Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in
Philadelphia,102 U. PA. L. Rav. 1031, 1051-52 (1954) (only 52% of bailed defendants
were convicted while 82% of jailed defendants were convicted).
108. 5 Cal. 3d 313, 318-19, 486 P.2d 1213, 1217, 96 Cal. Rptr; 13, 17 (1971) (emphasis added).
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nature' 0 9 and not to be used as a criminal punishment, then their implementation may be used to protect the individual as well as having the
effect of protecting society. Of course applicable due process standards must be followed and the defendant (or more properly perhaps
110
the "patient") is entitled to a judicial hearing.
Clearly, however, these civil commitment proceedings have very
limited application and do not offer a general alternative to preventive
detention to keep society safe from truly dangerous persons. The
hired gun, the racketeer and other professional criminals probably
could not be reached constitutionally through these provisions. The
basis of such statutes is that the danger to society must result from the
mental disorder"' and usually the arresting officer is not aware of suf109. Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1489 (1966). If
it is civil commitment then detention is not unconstitutional and there is no denial of
criminal justice, because the basic premise of such a proceeding is that the accused is
so sick that he is not responsive to the deterrence provided by criminal law and thus
cannot be dealt with within criminal procedure. See also People v. Lipscomb, 263 Cal.
App. 2d 59, 69 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1968); People v. Gonzales, 256 Cal. App. 2d 50, 63
Cal. Rptr. 581 (1967).
110. Statute provides that "[w]hen any person, as a result of mental disorder, is
a danger to others, or to himself' he may be taken into custody and placed in a facility
for 72-hour treatment and evaluation. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5150 (West
1972). There must be reasonable cause to detain the person and an application in writing stating the circumstances is required. Each person thus admitted shall receive the
evaluation and treatment as soon as possible and shall be released within 72 hours if
the person no longer requires treatment and evaluation. Id. § 5252 (West Supp. 1973).
If he requires additional treatment he may be certified for not more than 14 days of
involuntary treatment. Id. § 5250. Once again the statute provides that if the person
improves sufficiently for him to leave, he must be released and in any event must be
released prior to 14 days. Id. § 5254.
Sanctions are placed on officials who wrongfully detain persons entitled to release
by imposing civil liability. Id. § 5255. Criminal or civil liability may be imposed upon
one seeking such a petition with knowledge that the person does not pose a danger to
himself or others. Id. § 5203. This provision would obviate the subterfuge of detaining
persons under this statute strictly for purposes of preventive detention. In addition, the
person has other safeguards, primarily the right to habeas corpus and the right to counsel. Id. § 5252.1.
If after or during the 14 day period the person attempts or threatens suicide while
under treatment he may be kept for an additional 14 days. Id. § 5260. If at the end
of that 14 day period he has threatened, attempted, or inflicted physical harm on another, he can be kept an additional period, not exceeding 90 days. Id. § 5300. There
are similar provisions for chronic alcoholics and narcotics addicts. See generally Note,
Control and Treatment of Narcotics Addicts: Civil Commitment in California, 6 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 35 (1969); Belton, Civil Commitment of Narcotics Addicts in California: A Case History of Statutory Construction, 19 HASTINCS L.J. 603 (1968); George,
Due Process in Protective Activities, 8 SANTA CLARA LAW. 133 (1968); People v. Myers,
6 Cal. 3d 811, 494 P.2d 684, 100 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1972); iz re Marks, 71 Cal. 2d 33,
453 P.2d 441, 77 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969); People v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. App. 3d 911,
98 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1971).
111. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5150 (West Supp. 1973).
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ficient facts to warrant commencing proceedings under the provisions. Even assuming that a peace officer did take the person into
custody as a person dangerous because of a mental disorder,"112 that
would only be a delaying tactic if the person did not in fact suffer
from a mental disorder.
A Proposed Alternative: Conditions
The rising crime rate in this country indicates that the elimination
of crime must be given increased attention. Because that need is so
great, however, we must be careful not to overreact and infringe on
the rights of all citizens for years to come. Instead of a slipshod solution to the problem, greater emphasis should be placed on realistic alternatives to imposing preventive detention. 113
The most realistic alternative is to put conditions on bail. This
may well be the most effective way of preventing a defendant from
fleeing as well as serving as a deterrent to future criminal acts. Of
course, such conditions must protect the interests of society while preserving the defendant's fundamental right to bail. It is submitted that
imposition of any conditions necessary to accomplish these goals would
be preferable to pretrial incarceration.
The conditions must be tailored to the circumstances of the case.
Factors such as family ties in the area, employment, financial security,
and property holdings of the accused would be relevant in determining
the number of conditions needed and their stringency. Either the legislature or the trial courts could prescribe such conditions on pretrial
release. There are values of public order and social welfare which
constitutionally justify some qualification on bail freedom by way of
the police power of the state.
Examples of the conditions which could be placed on bail are as
follows: release into custody of the family; a requirement to report
weekly to an officer of the court, a clergyman, a doctor, or other professional person; or a requirement that the accused seek employment
or continue at his present job. One or all of the conditions could be
imposed, depending on the facts of the case. For "grave" felonies,
further conditions could be imposed relinquishment of a passport, geographical limitations on travel, and even a requirement to sleep in
112. Id. § 5213 (West 1969).
113. Ervin, Foreward: Preventive Detention-A Step Backward for Criminal Justice, 6 H v. Civ. Rxcmss-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 291 (1971). Senator Ervin in discussing
the District of Columbia Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91358, 84 Stat. 473, points out what can happen when "politics, public fear, and creative
hysteria join together to find a simple solution to a complex problem." Id. at 292.
(The provisions relating to preventive detention are found in D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 231321 to -1332 (1970)).
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jail. If intimidation of witnesses is a problem, the defendant should
be prohibited from any contact at all with such witnesses.
There are, of course, constitutional limits to the above and it must
be understood that the implementation of such conditions cannot abrogate the basic right to bail. For example, requiring a defendant to
spend each night in jail might well be valid, but if he were only released five hours a day it would be of questionable constitutionality;
and if he were released only one hour a day it would certainly be an unconstitutional abrogation of his right to bail." 4
There are very few cases involving conditions placed on bail because such a procedure is not used to any great extent at present.
However, it appears that if the conditions are reasonable, realistic and
relevant to the case at hand, it would be within the police power of the
state to impose them.
The major shortcoming with the above proposal is the problem of
what course to take if the accused violates the conditions of his bail.
In the extreme, what if he says he will not abide by any of them, arguing that his entitlement to bail is a matter of right? There are two possible theories under which such a defendant's bail may be revoked:
first, by knowingly violating conditions of bail he has waived his right
to bail; and second, by violating the conditions he has disrupted the judicial process, an acceptable ground for denying bail or revoking it." 5
However, even if these two sanctions are constitutionally suspect,
there could be other remedies. Perhaps even more desirable than revoking bail as "punishment" for violating conditions, the defendant
may be deterred from doing so by imposition of criminal sanctions
for such violations. Thus, he could face additional punishment for
criminal contempt. Another effective alternative would be to make
bail violations a separate substantive offense. This would leave his initial right to bail constitutionally guaranteed. If there is any deterrent
value at all in making acts criminal and providing for punishment, it
would be present here.
114. Cf. Rehman v. California, 85 S. Ct. 8 (1964) (Douglas, Circuit J.), where
it was ruled an unconstitutional violation of due process to take away a doctor's medical
license as a condition to his being released on bail.
115. Advisory Committee on Pretrial Proceedings, REPORT TO THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:

STANDARDS RE-

LATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE § 5.6 (Approved Draft 1968); cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397
U.S. 337, 343 (1970): "defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he
has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the
courtroom." His disruption of the judicial process in this case prevented him from exercising his right of confrontation. By analogy, this reasoning could apply to the defendant who continues to violate the conditions of his bail,
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For an example of how the above system could work the following model may be examined: John Doe, as a condition for release, is
required to report once a week to an officer of the court. He is made
well aware of possible criminal sanctions for his willful failure to comply. 116 If he willfully fails to report, he could be rearrested and
charged with an additional substantive crime-violation of conditions
of bail. However, because he is still entitled to bail he must be released, but now it becomes permissible to stiffen the conditions (e.g.,
report to officer of the court once each day). In addition, the possible
ramification for a subsequent violation could be a more severe substantive penalty (e.g., one year for first violation, two years for second violation). Of course, if it is obvious that he will continue to violate the
conditions of his bail, the judicial recourse would be to have a hearing
with appropriate due process and to try the individual on the substantive offense immediately.
Once this type of program is implemented there would, of course,
be fewer persons in jail. As shown by studies, 11 7 defendants, if released, have a better chance of not being convicted because they can
better prepare their defenses; if convicted, such persons often make a
respectable showing that their subsequent imprisonment would serve
no useful purpose. If this is true it is certainly a desirable goal. It
could also have the valuable side effect of expediting the judicial process. As a result, court calendars would not be so congested, and the
person who violated the conditions of his bail could be moved up on
the calendar and his case dispensed with much sooner.
As an additional deterrent against crimes committed while on
bail, the possible punishment for further crimes could be increased if
committed by one on bail. In all these situations the effect would not
be the initial denial of bail. Rather, when the defendant finally comes
to trial he could be tried on two or more counts; i.e., the original offense, the subsequent crime or offense, plus possible additional punishment for "jumping bail" or violating conditions of bail. In other words
the defendant, if thoroughly advised of the possible penalties he faces
if he jumps bail, commits another crime, or violates the conditions of
bail, will ask himself, "Is the game worth the candle?" It is submitted
that in most cases he will answer "No!"
Since the effectiveness of pretrial detention is highly suspect, further study should definitely be conducted. Obviously, as long as people are detained it can be shown that they are not committing any
further crimes. More realistically, however, a program could be set up
as follows: Take the least dangerous offense first. Release all persons
116. It is extremely important to advise the defendant fully of the sanctions as deterrence would be the sole purpose of the additional offense.
117. Rankin, The Effect of PretrialDetention, 39 N.Y.U.L. RPv. 641 (1964).
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arrested for such crime, without money bail, but with necessary conditions attached. Then chart their progress until final termination of
their case to see if they should have been detained. If the statistics
show that there was no correlation between their initial arrest and their
subsequent conduct, 1 8 then the program could be expanded to include other crimes. By so doing, we could at least have some reliable
figures on the nature of subsequent offenses, and the rates of recidivism; in short, we would know whether the system is working or notIf as a result of such studies it is clearly shown that pretrial release is not working and that we can accurately predict who will commit the future crimes, then preventive detention may have to be used.
However, only after such an experiment is implemented can we gauge
the efficacy of preventive detention as a protective concept.
This leads to the final alternative-constitutional amendment of
bail clause followed by legislative enactment. If it is reliably determined that the danger posed to society is so great that preventive detention is the only viable answer, then the right to bail can be abrogated or
modified by inclusion into the constitution of certain exceptions to that
right. This has been done in some states for specific situations"' and
could be effectuated in those jurisdictions with a right to bail in all
noncapital cases, like California.
Conclusion
The constitution of California and some thirty-eight other states
deal specifically with the subject of bail, deeming it a matter of right in
all noncapital cases and even in capital cases where the proof is not
evident nor the presumption great. States that have adopted this provision did so in light of the realization that arbitrary or unreasonable
restrictions and denials of bail were typical examples of the invasion
of personal liberty by the British Crown which the American colonists
found intolerable. In fact, every state with such a provision included
it in its bill of rights or declaration of rights; it was considered that fundamental.
The meaning of the bill of rights cannot be changed by legislative
enactment or judicial fiat. It can only be altered by changing the con118. Studies tend to indicate that there is no correlation or at least that it would
have been impossible to predict.
119. E.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. I, § 22, where in addition to providing for the exception for capital offenses, it is provided that bail may be denied to those accused of
"[flelony offenses, committed when the person charged is already admitted to bail on
a separate felony charge and where the proof is evident or the presumption great as to
the present charge." In Florida, the additional exception to bail as a matter of right
is for "an offense punishable by life imprisonment." FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 14 (1968
rev.); Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So. 2d 499, 504 (Fla. 1972).

November 1974]

BAEL AS A MATTER OF RIGHT

stitution itself-a process which must be accomplished by the people.
This was the realization of the California Supreme Court in the Underwood case. The court's elimination of the "public safety exception" which had crept into the law is thus quite sound.
Justice McComb, now of the California Supreme Court, said:
The people of the State of California through their Constitution
have provided in Article I, Section 6, that "[A]II persons shall be
bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses ....
This mandate of the people cannot be legally set aside by the civil,
legislative or judicial branch of the government. It will be observed that the people, who are sovereign, have seen fit to provide
that with but one exception, to wit, where a person has been
charged with a capital offense, all persons are entitled to bail as
a matter of right.120
And in conclusion, Justice McComb stated:
Irrespective of the villainy of the accused or the heinousness of his
offense, without regard for public opinion, or for the personal views
of an individual officer as to the wisdom of the constitutional provision [regarding bail] such provision is binding without qualification upon the courts until the people have
21 by inherited processes
legally erased the constitutional mandate.1
Preventive detention has not been proven to be such an effective
or responsible alternative to crime prevention as to justify the shedding
of rights which would affect each person in our society. Pretrial incarceration is a regressive solution to the complex problem of crime in
America; far less onerous solutions exist. By allowing the greatest
number of persons possible free on bail with conditions attached
thereto, we not only assure their presence at trial, but we also protect
the favored and fundamental rights of the accused. Such a course is
both feasible and just.
DonaldM. Egeland*

120. In re Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 219, 233 P.2d 159, 162 (1951) (emphasis

in original).
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